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Abstract
How 401(k) eligibility a¤ects saving is a major unresolved issue. I address this
question by exploiting a plausibly exogenous change in 401(k) eligibility: Some indi-
viduals are ineligible for their rms 401(k) plan when they begin to work at the rm,
but become eligible when they have worked at the rm long enough. I nd that 401(k)
eligibility raises saving in the 401(k) substantially, but I nd no evidence that 401(k)
saving is o¤set by decreases in other nancial assets. I also nd no evidence that
increases in saving following 401(k) eligibility are driven by intertemporal subsitution.
In response to 401(k) eligibility, accumulation of durable goods decreases signicantly,
providing the most direct existing evidence of a decrease in consumption in response to
eligibility.
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1 Introduction
Does 401(k) eligibility raise saving? When eligible for 401(k)s, individuals could save in
their 401(k)s rather than saving in other forms. In principle, the positive income e¤ect
of tax-advantaged savings programs (such as 401(k)s) could even decrease personal
saving. Moreover, as a tax expenditure, 401(k)s could decrease public saving by more
than they increase private saving. Since a large fraction of personal savings in the U.S.
is in 401(k)s, these issues are crucial in designing strategies to raise U.S. savings rates.
Previous work on the e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility on saving has not reached a consen-
sus. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) use the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP) to compare the nancial assets of those eligible for 401(k)s because they
work in rms that o¤er 401(k) plans, to the nancial assets of those in rms that do not
o¤er 401(k)s, in a cross-section of households. They also compare the nancial assets
of eligible and ineligible households in repeated cross-sections. Both of these strategies
indicate that 401(k) saving is not o¤set by decreases in other nancial assets.2 Venti
and Wise (1996) compare the assets of individuals who are statistically similar, except
that they reached a given age in di¤erent calendar years. As a result, some cohorts
had longer than others to contribute to special saving programs. They nd that those
cohorts who had longer to contribute to 401(k)s and IRAs have substantially higher
assets in these vehicles, but they nd no di¤erence between the other nancial assets
of the older and younger workers. Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, 1996) use the same
data as Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) and Venti and Wise (1996) and use similar
strategies for identication. However, Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, 1996) nd that
401(k) eligibility has no e¤ect on overall saving, in part because 401(k) saving is o¤set
by decreases in home equity.
While these papers have made important contributions to our understanding of
401(k)s and saving, there are several acknowledged limitations of the approaches they
take (Bernheim, 2002). First, workers may have unobserved tastes for saving that may
be correlated, even conditional on observables, with 401(k) eligibility. For example,
those with higher unobserved tastes for saving may choose more often to work in rms
that o¤er 401(k)s than those with lower unobserved tastes for saving. Second, turning
to the analysis based on repeated cross-sections, the composition of the population of
households ineligible and eligible for 401(k)s has changed over time, as more employers
began to o¤er 401(k)s. Therefore, the unobserved savings tastes of the ineligible and
eligible populations may not have been constant over time. Third, in the data used in
this literature, householdswealth in Dened Benet (DB) and Dened Contribution
pensions (other than 401(k) wealth) is unobservable. If there is substitution between
401(k) wealth and wealth in these other forms, then the wealth of households ineligible
for 401(k)s is understated relative to the wealth of eligibles. Fourth, turning to the
2Within the repeated cross-sections, they also stratify individuals by whether they participate in
IRAs, nding similar results within these groups to those on the un-stratied repeated cross-sections.
2
cohort-based analysis of Venti and Wise (1996), it is possible that successively younger
cohorts had di¤erent propensities to save than older cohorts, which would confound
comparisons across cohorts. Finally, these papers leave open the question of whether
401(k) saving has an e¤ect on direct measures of the level and form of consumption.
If 401(k)s raise saving, then consumption should correspondingly fall.
The empirical strategy of this paper attempts to address all of these issues. In
the context of a debate over the existing evidence, there is value in introducing a new
empirical strategy to re-evaluate the evidence. I use longitudinal data on households
savings decisions, in combination with a plausibly exogenous within-person change in
401(k) eligibility, to identify the e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility. Many rms exclude their
employees from participating in the rms 401(k) plan at the beginning of the em-
ployeestenure at the rm. Federal law dictates that for-prot rms cannot exclude
employees from participating in a 401(k) plan for more than one year. My empirical
strategy exploits this, using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach. I examine house-
holds containing individuals who report in their rst year on a new job that they do
not participate in their rms 401(k) plan because they have not worked at the rm
long enough. I compare their saving over this rst year to their saving in their second
year on the job, when they are now eligible for their rms 401(k) plan. The change
in their saving from the rst year to the second year is then compared to the change
in saving of a control group: households containing individuals who are eligible for the
401(k) in both their rst and second year at their jobs.
My estimates indicate that while 401(k) eligibility raises 401(k) contributions sub-
stantially, eligibility does not crowd out saving in other nancial assets and does not
increase net liabilities. Indeed, I nd suggestive evidence that savings in IRAs may
rise in response to 401(k) eligibility, consistent with a "crowd-in" hypothesis (Bernheim,
2002). I nd that the increase in saving corresponds to a decrease in consumption.
Householdsaccumulation of durable goods falls substantially and signicantly when el-
igible for a 401(k). Since durable goods arguably represent a form of saving, the results
indicate that our view on how much 401(k) eligibility raises saving may in turn depend
on the extent to which we consider durable goods holdings to be present consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The data and identication
strategy are described in Section 2. Section 3 proceeds to the results. Section 4
concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Strategy
A. Identication Strategy and Sample Description
In the main results, the change in savings from Year 1 to Year 2 of households
who are initially ineligible for their 401(k), but later become eligible, is compared to
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the change in savings from Year 1 to Year 2 of those who are always eligible.3 This
strategy addresses several important issues. First, it allows individual xed e¤ects and
exploits within-person variation in 401(k) eligibility, which addresses the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity. Second, while wealth in DB plans and non-401(k) DC plans
is unobservable in the data, it is reasonable that the present discounted value of wealth
in these forms does not change di¤erentially over time in the treatment and control
groups. Third, the dependent variable is saving or expenditure, rather than net worth.
By examining expenditure measures, I conduct an additional test of the hypothesis
that 401(k)s raise saving. Finally, I seek to illuminate new and more detailed facets
of consumption and saving behavior, by examining the response of di¤erent types of
consumption and saving to 401(k) eligibility. I now describe the data and regression
specication in detail.
The data are drawn from the 1996 SIPP, in which Year 0 corresponds approximately
to calendar year 1997, Year 1 corresponds approximately to calendar year 1998, and
Year 2 corresponds approximately to calendar year 1999.4 The data are structured
as follows. Assets, liabilities, and measures of expenditures are observed in Waves 3,
6, 9, and 12. Waves occur every four months, so assets are observed once each year,
over the course of four years. Whether the individual is temporarily ineligible for the
401(k) is observed in Wave 7.5
In constructing the main variables, I use responses to several questions. If indi-
viduals answer "yes" to both of the following two questions, then I code their rms as
sponsoring a tax-deferred pension plan. Respondents are asked, "Now Id like to ask
about retirement plans o¤ered on this job, not Social Security, but plans that are spon-
sored by your (job/business). This includes regular pension plans as well as other kinds
of retirement plans like thrift and savings plans, 401(k) or 403(b) plans, and deferred
prot-sharing and stock plans. Does your (job/business) have any kind of pension or
retirement plans for anyone in your company or organization?" They are also asked,
"Is the plan something like a 401(k) plan, where workers contribute to the plan and
their contributions are tax deferred?" In other words, if the rm o¤ers a pension, and
the pension plan is tax-deferred, and the individual works at a for-prot rm, then the
individual works at a rm that o¤ers a 401(k). Pensions from both individualsprimary
and secondary jobs are included. Individuals who do not participate in their rms
tax-deferred pension plan are also asked, "Reason respondent not covered by pension
plan. Why are you not included? Havent worked long enough for this employer." If
the respondent answers "yes" to this question, then he or she is considered temporarily
ineligible (i.e. he or she is a member of the treatment group).
3"Year 1" refers to the rst year that households are at their rm, whereas "Year 2" corresponds
to the second year. "Year 0" refers to the year immediately prior to the rst year spent at the rm.
4The exact dates depend on the SIPP rotation group to which an individual belongs.
5No other SIPP panel both has data on whether the individual is temporarily ineligible for the
401(k) and has data on Year 2 saving. All other SIPP panels are shorter than the 1996 panel.
4
Individuals must possess several characteristics to be included in the sample. They
must work at a for-prot rm (because the law requiring rms to exclude employees
for at most one year applies only to for-prot rms). They must have started the job
they are observed to hold in Wave 7 the wave when the question about temporary
ineligibility is asked one year or less before Wave 7. Except where otherwise noted,
they must also work at a rm that o¤ers a 401(k) plan. Limiting the sample to those
individuals who remain at the same job from Year 1 to Year 2 yields extremely similar
results to those reported in the text. Following the previous literature the sample, is
limited to individuals under 65, thus avoiding issues relating to the decumulation of
assets at retirement.6
B. Main Specication
In the central regressions, the main independent variable of interest is a dummy
that equals 1 when the individual responds that he or she is temporarily ineligible for
a 401(k). The dependent variable is the di¤erence in savings between Year 1 and
Year 2. In particular, if Ani represents the level of a given type of assets, liabilities, or
expenditures of individual i in wave n of the 1996 SIPP, then the dependent variable
(in most of the regressions) is Yi = [ln(A12i )  ln(A9i )]  [ln(A9i )  ln(A6i )]. Each value of
Ani has been replaced by A
n
i + 1, so that the logarithm of the variable is dened for all
observations. Waves 3 and 6 represent the beginning and end, respectively, of Year 0 at
the rm; Waves 6 and 9 represent the beginning and end of Year 1 at the rm; andWaves
9 and 12 represent the beginning and end of Year 2. The logarithmic specication is
appropriate because assets and liabilities are approximately log-normally distributed.
Other ways of addressing the non-normality of the distribution include estimating the
results in levels but trimming outliers, or by estimating median regressions. Trimming
outliers produces similar estimates to those shown here, but the signicance of the
estimates is reduced. Median regressions show similar results, although unsurprisingly,
the treatment dummy almost always has a smaller estimated impact on the median
than on the mean. The coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy represents the di¤erential
increase in saving from Year 1 to Year 2 in the treatment group relative to the control
group, as a percentage of initial assets of the type in question.
The independent variable could also be considered to be in rst di¤erences, since the
dummy that equals 1 when an individual is temporarily ineligible could be seen as the
rst di¤erence (from Year 1 to Year 2) of a variable that equals 1 when an individual
is eligible for the 401(k) (in Year 2) and equals 0 when ineligible (in Year 1).
The regression equation is therefore specied as:
Yi = 0 + 1Ti +Xi + "i; (1)
6Poterba, Venti, Wise (1995, 6), Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, 6), and Benjamin (2003) also limit
the sample to those under retirement age.
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where 0 is the constant term, 1 is the coe¢ cient of interest on the treatment dummy
Ti, Xi represents the control variables,  represents a vector coe¢ cients on these con-
trols, and "i is an error term. Note that in a panel with two periods, this rst-di¤erenced
regression is equivalent to a di¤erences-in-di¤erences regression with individual xed
e¤ects.
C. Possible Limitations
It may be that only individuals who have a particularly high taste for saving will
respond that they are temporarily ineligible for their rms 401(k) plan. There may
be other employees who are in fact ineligible for this reason, but who are not aware of
this fact. The estimates should be interpreted as local to this group. However, the
percentage of the sample in the treatment group (42%, both weighted and unweighted)
is not far below what one would expect from a survey of rms regarding their 401(k)
plans (Prot-Sharing/401k Council of America 1998). This survey found that 43.8% of
for-prot employers require employees to wait a full year before participating in a 401(k).
To address the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity, I also match individuals in the
treatment and control groups with a propensity score, which is all the more powerful
in combination with xed e¤ects.
Another limitation of this strategy is that I do not know how long people have
actually been excluded from their rms 401(k) plan. Certain people who respond that
they are eligible for their rms 401(k) could have been excluded from the rms 401(k)
for an unknown period of time prior to the time at which they respond to the SIPP
questionnaire. People who respond that they are ineligible will continue to be ineligible
for an unknown period of time. Even though I do not know how long individuals are
eligible or ineligible, the treatment dummy is positively correlated with the change from
Year 1 to Year 2 in the amount of time eligible. In other words, because they respond in
Wave 7 that they are temporarily ineligible, they will have been temporarily ineligible
for a longer total time during Waves 6-9 than the total period of time for which they
are ineligible during Waves 9-12. While I will not be able to determine exactly how
much eligibility raises saving, I will be able to compare the rise in 401(k) saving to the
fall (or rise) in savings in other forms in response to 401(k) eligibility, thus answering
the question of how much a dollar of 401(k) saving crowds out other saving. Given a
certain level of 401(k) contributions, it will then be possible to calculate how much of
this represents new saving.
D. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics, which show values of the covariates from Wave 6 of the 1996
SIPP, are shown in Table 1. The mean values of age, income, and assets are somewhat
higher in the control group than in the treatment group. This is not surprising, since
smaller employers, and those that experience higher turnover, are more likely to exclude
employees temporarily from participating in the rms 401(k). The xed costs of setting
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up 401(k) are more burdensome for smaller and higher-turnover rms. Smaller rms
and higher-turnover rms tend to have workers who are younger and have lower income
and assets.
3 Results
A. Preliminary Evidence
Figure 1 shows the pattern of 401(k) balance increases in the treatment and control
groups in Years 1 and 2. For individuals in the control group, the increase in the 401(k)
balance is nearly identical in Year 1 and Year 2. For individuals in the treatment
group, the increase is dramatically larger in Year 2 than in Year 1. The increases in
the balance represent both the increase in the price of existing 401(k) assets and the
value of new 401(k) contributions (minus the value of 401(k) withdrawals, which are
rare in this sample). The stock market was increasing in value quickly during the
period in question (the late 1990s), so existing assets usually increased in value quickly,
which contributes heavily to the increase in 401(k) balances in the treatment group in
Year 1. The percentage increases are large in part because these individuals are young
and have small 401(k) balances, so that each years worth of contributions represents
a substantial percentage increase in the 401(k) balance. To adjust for the inuence of
other covariates, I turn to the regressions.
B. Main Results
The main results are displayed in Table 2. The rst column displays the coe¢ cients
on the treatment dummy when no controls are included in the regressions. Given a
coe¢ cient estimate, it is possible calculate the dollar value of the e¤ect of treatment
that is implied by the coe¢ cient. The second column displays these dollar equiva-
lents, calculated by applying the coe¢ cient estimates to the mean asset values in the
treatment group in Wave 6. The third column displays a specication in which the con-
trol variables are age, age squared, household income, and dummies for four education
categories (no high school diploma, exactly a high school diploma, some college, and
college graduate). The fourth column shows the dollar equivalents of the coe¢ cient
estimates in the third column. Results are generally extremely similar under the two
di¤erent specications, and are similar with other choices of the control variables (in-
cluding controlling for whether the individual has a dened benet pension). Robust
standard errors are clustered by household. The coe¢ cients on the control variables
are almost always insignicantly di¤erent from zero at the 30% signicance level, and
they have not been shown in the tables. The R-squared is always small (usually below
.01), which is unsurprising given the large amount of noise in measuring assets and the
rst-di¤erenced specication, and it has also been omitted from the tables. In the
tables, liabilities are all in positive terms, with a larger number representing a larger
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liability (so that a larger value of a liability represents smaller net worth, all other
things equal).
In the discussion that follows, I restrict attention to columns 3 and 4 of Table 2,
since the results are similar with and without controls. In row 1 of Table 2, in which
the dependent variable is the 401(k) balance, the coe¢ cient on "Temporarily Ineligible"
(.32) is signicant at the 1% level. Of course, it is unsurprising that 401(k) eligibility
raises saving in 401(k)s. Column 4 shows that 401(k) eligibility is estimated to cause
an increase of $1172 in 401(k) savings. If initial assets are zero, the percentage increase
in assets may be large. To address this concern, I also estimate regressions that include
a dummy for beginning Year 1 with a zero 401(k) balance (or zero of another asset), or
by adding a dummy for beginning Year 1 with a small 401(k) balance (e.g. a balance
below $100). The results are substantively unchanged by adding such a dummy.
Interestingly, in row 2, in which the dependent variable represents the di¤erence
between Year 1 and Year 2 in the increase in the logged IRA balance, the coe¢ cient
on "Temporarily Ineligible" is positive, with a substantial coe¢ cient that is signi-
cant at the 10% level. While the dollar equivalent of the point estimate is large, it
is also imprecisely estimated. If 401(k) eligibility encourages households to overcome
the xed costs of opening accounts with mutual funds or other investment vehicles,
or to learn about nancial markets, then it may be less costly to put money in IRA
accounts. 401(k) participation often teaches individuals about nancial markets. El-
igibility often comes with reminders by ones rm to save, pamphlets emphasizing the
importance of retirement savings, the necessity of learning about nancial markets, and
the like. Therefore, individuals could be encouraged by 401(k) eligibility to save in
IRAs. The e¤ect of eligibility on other assets (row 3), is negative, but relatively small
and insignicant.
Turning to secured and unsecured debt, the point estimates are all insignicant and
negative. The negative sign may appear puzzling, and I return to this issue shortly.
The 95% condence interval bounds the possible increase in debt at a relatively low
level. As before, the results are similar under OLS and under the matching estimator.
If 401(k) eligibility raises saving, then consumption should correspondingly decrease.
I investigate holdings of durable goods in the nal row of the table. The SIPP contains
measures of the total value of various durable goods that households may purchase.
Here, durable goods accumulation over a period of time is dened as the change in
the total value of householdsdurable goods holdings over that time.7 The SIPP has
a measure of the value of householdsholdings of several durable goods: cars, boats,
motorcycles, and RVs. Therefore, I use the change in the total value of households
holdings of all of these goods as the measure of durable goods expenditure. While this
7Note that a change in the value of durable goods holdings could result from purchases or sales of
durable goods, or from appreciation or depreciation of the value of existing durable goods holdings.
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does not measure the value of all durable goods that one might purchase, it represents
a proxy for total durable goods holdings, just as food consumption is often used as a
proxy for total consumption.
Accumulation of durable goods falls substantially in response to eligibility, and
the coe¢ cient estimate is highly signicant. The dollar equivalent of the e¤ect on
durable goods value is surprisingly large, though imprecisely estimated with a condence
interval large enough that we cannot rule out that the increase in 401(k) saving due to
eligibility is the same as the decrease in durable goods value.8 Since there are large
outlier observations of durable goods value, it is not surprising that I estimate sizeable
but imprecisely estimated coe¢ cients.
It is possible that the fall in durable goods value could account for the fall in debt
observed earlier. If households spend less on durable goods, they need not accrue as
much debt to pay for these durable goods.9 Indeed, a regression of the change in secured
debt accumulation from Year 1 to Year 2 on the change in durable goods value from
Year 1 to Year 2 and the controls yields a coe¢ cient on the change in durable goods
value of .30 (with a standard error of .06)l. Running this regression on only the sample
of those who report being temporarily ineligible for the 401(k) yields similar results
(a coe¢ cient of .33 on the treatment dummy, with a standard error of .10). Thus, it
seems that decreases in durable goods accumulation could account for decreases in debt
accumulation.
The SIPP has only a handful measures of nondurables consumption, such as ex-
penditures on commuting and expenditures on utilities. The point estimates suggest
small and insignicant responses of these variables. Since these measures are spotty
and idiosyncratic measures of nondurables consumption, the results are omitted.
In sum, the main results show a substantial increase in 401(k) saving in response to
401(k) eligibility. Little o¤set is seen in other nancial assets or liabilities. Indeed, the
point estimates indicate a weakly signicant increase in IRA saving. 401(k) eligibility
leads to a decrease in accumulation of durable goods in response to eligibility, which is
further evidence for an increase in saving.
C. Validity Checks
As noted earlier, it is possible that individuals in the treatment and control groups
di¤er along unobserved dimensions. The presence of individual xed e¤ects helps to
8If durable goods are indivisible and individuals are liquidity constrained, 401(k) eligibility could
even cause one to hold o¤ on durable goods purchases whose value might exceed ones 401(k) contri-
butions.
9This is consistent with several possible models of rational behavior. For example, if durable goods
are indivisible and individuals are liquidity constrained, then when individuals save more, they could
forego a durable goods purchase that they would otherwise have nanced with debt.
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mitigate this concern, as they remove individual unobserved e¤ects that are constant
over time. However, if the unobserved di¤erences di¤erentially inuence the savings
paths of households in the treatment and control groups, then even xed e¤ects may not
be su¢ cient to address unobserved hetergeneity. To help address this concern, I have
also estimated the results using a propensity score match in Table A1.10 Observations
in the treatment and control groups are matched according to years of education, age,
household income, marital status, household size, and rm size, using stratied match-
ing. The rst stage results in ve blocks, which are balanced along the covariates.
The coe¢ cients and standard errors using the propensity score estimator are extremely
similar to those relying on OLS.
Table 3 presents an alternative set of estimates of the e¤ect of 401(k)s on saving.
Assuming that the treatment and control groups are comparable except for the osten-
sibly exogenous dummy for temporary ineligibility in Year 1, I can compare Year 1
saving between the treatment and control groups, as an alternative estimate of the ef-
fect of 401(k) eligibility. Table 3 regresses Year 1 saving on the treatment dummy and
controls. To compare the Table 2 point estimates with those in Table 3 more readily,
the treatment dummy is dened di¤erently in Table 3 than in Table 2. In Table 3, the
treatment dummy equals 0 when the individual does report being temporarily ineligi-
ble for the 401(k), and equals 1 when the individual does not report being temporarily
ineligible for the 401(k). Thus, the estimated coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy in
Table 3 represents the estimated e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility on the dependent variable
(as it does in Table 2).
The regressions in row 1 of Table 3 again show a positive and signicant e¤ect of
401(k) eligibility on 401(k) savings. There is again a positive and signicant e¤ect on
IRA savings (signicant at 5% with no controls), and again a negative and highly signif-
icant of 401(k) eligibility on durable goods accumulation. As expected, the estimated
e¤ect of eligibility is always similar in Tables 2 and 3. Like Table 2, Table 3 shows
that 401(k) eligibility causes a decrease in debt and an increase in other assets, though
these estimates are again insignicant. The propensity score results are again similar
to those from the OLS regression and have been omitted.
Still another robustness check involves a linear specication, rather than the loga-
rithmic specication employed thus far. In a linear version of the regressions in Table 3,
assets (or liabilities) in wave 9 are regressed on the treatment dummy, assets in wave 6,
and controls.11 These regressions are displayed in Table 4. In the version with controls,
10A matching estimator was rst used to estimate the e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility on savings by
Benjamin (2003), who compares the net worth of those eligible and ineligible for a 401(k) in a cross-
section.
11 Since a linear specication will create additional noise in the dependent variable (due to non-
normality), it makes sense to estimate the results on the cross section as in Table 3, rather than the
rst-di¤erenced results analogous to Table 2 (particularly given that the results are similar in Tables
2 and 3).
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there is a positive, signicant, and large e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility on the 401(k) balance
and the IRA balance. All other e¤ects are insignicant, though the point estimate of
the e¤ect on durable goods is still negative. Since this regression is in levels, I can
investigate the e¤ect on net worth. (Earlier it was not possible to investigate the e¤ect
on net worth, since net worth is sometimes negative and it is not possible to take its
log.) There is a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on net worth. Focusing
on the version with controls, while the point estimate of the e¤ect of eligibility on net
worth is large ($11,110), it is imprecisely estimated, with a 95% condence interval that
does not rule out a relatively small e¤ect of $1,000. Thus, the true e¤ect on net worth
could be much smaller. Given the large amount of noise in measuring net worth, it
is unsurprising to nd a large but imprecisely estimated e¤ect. The size of the e¤ect
also makes sense because the estimated e¤ect of eligibility on IRA assets was positive.
It is worth noting that di¤erences in median nancial assets between those eligible and
ineligible for a 401(k) are several times as large as median 401(k) balances for eligibles
(Poterba Venti, and Wise 1994; Engen, Gale, and Scholz 1994). It is possible that this
indicates substantial "crowd-in" of non-401(k) savings in response to 401(k) eligibility,
which could also be the case here.
In principle, the results thus far could in part represent intertemporal substitution.
In other words, temporarily ineligible households could be waiting to save until they
become eligible for their 401(k)s, holding down their saving while they are temporarily
ineligible. While intertemporal substitution is possible in theory, empirical work usually
nds a very small elasticity of intertemporal substitution (e.g. Dynan, 1993), suggesting
that this should not be a major concern in practice. The hypothesis that households
are intertemporally substituting predicts that the 401(k) saving of temporarily ineligible
individuals should fall from Year 0 to Year 1 as they wait to save in their 401(k)s.
Meanwhile, there is no expected future increase in the rate of return on saving in other
forms. Saving in other forms could rise as those temporarily ineligible for their 401(k)s
substitute into saving other forms.
If individuals are engaging in intertemporal substitution, then savings in Year 1 will
be lower than it would have been, if individuals were always ineligible for the 401(k).
This implies that I can test for intertemporal substitution by comparing the saving in
Year 1 of individuals who are temporarily ineligible for their 401(k), relative to the
Year 1 saving of individuals who are ineligible for a 401(k) in both Year 1 and Year 2
(because they work in a rm that does not o¤er a 401(k)). If temporarily ineligible
individuals are engaging in intertemporal substitution, then those who are temporarily
ineligible should save less in Year 1 than those who are always ineligible. An even
more stringent test compares the Year 1 saving to Year 0 saving among always and
temporarily ineligible individuals, to test whether savings drops more from Year 0 to
Year 1 among those who are temporarily ineligible than among those who are always
ineligible. The two tests yield similar results. Table 5 presents the latter test.
In Table 5, the dependent variable is the change in logged assets, liabilities, or
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expenditures from Year 0 to Year 1. The sample is individuals who either report being
temporarily ineligible for their rms 401(k), or who report that they work in a rm
that does not o¤er a 401(k). Recall that I seek a treatment dummy that is positively
correlated with the rst di¤erence of 401(k) eligibility. Individuals are only asked in
Wave 7 whether they are temporarily eligible for the 401(k), so if they report being
temporarily ineligible, it may be that they have been temporarily ineligible since as
long ago as Wave 4. For example, suppose hypothetically that they have indeed been
ineligible since Wave 4. Then they would have spent more time ineligible for the 401(k)
during waves 3-6 (i.e. a total of eight months) than they spent ineligible for the 401(k)
during waves 6-9 (i.e. a total of four months). In other words, during waves 3-6, they
spent waves 4-6 ineligible for the 401(k), whereas during waves 6-9, they only spent
waves 6-7 ineligible. In this case, the treatment dummy is negatively correlated with
the rst di¤erence of 401(k) eligibility, which is precisely the opposite of what I seek.
I therefore must take additional precautions to make sure that the treatment dummy
is correlated with the rst di¤erence in 401(k) eligibility. Thus, I limit the sample in
Table 5 to those who began their job in Wave 5 or after. This reduces the sample size
to 656 observations. The treatment dummy in Table 5 (and all subsequent tables) is
dened as it was in Table 2. The dummy equals 1 when the individual does report
being temporarily ineligible for the 401(k), and equals 0 when the individual does not
report being temporarily ineligible for the 401(k). Thus, the estimated coe¢ cient on
the treatment dummy in Table 4 represents the estimated e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility in
Year 2 on the dependent variable (as in all other tables).
In Table 5, row 1, where 401(k) saving is the dependent variable, the coe¢ cient on
the treatment dummy is -.03 (p>.40) with a small equivalent dollar value of -$110. This
suggests that any temporary decrease in 401(k) saving in Year 1 is small. Furthermore,
individuals will be eligible for their 401(k)s long into the future. Presumably, the
elevated level of saving in Year 2 in response to 401(k) eligibility, maintained over a large
number of years, will be much larger than a potential small decrease in 401(k) saving in
Year 1.12 Thus, even if a bit of intertemporal substitution is occurring, 401(k)s appear
to raise saving overall. As before, two variables with many large outlier observations
(secured debt and durable goods) unsurprisingly have sizeable but imprecisely estimated
and insignicant coe¢ cients. I nd some evidence of substitution into other forms of
saving while individuals are temporarily ineligible for 401(k)s, as saving in other assets
rises (though not signicantly). The results are again similar when estimated through
a propensity score match, and these results have been omitted.
12As noted above, the treatment dummy may be correlated with the change from Year 1 to Year 2
in the amount of time eligible for the 401(k) to a di¤erent degree in Table 4 than in Table 2 (or Table
3). Thus, the main question of interest is how the fall in the rate of increase of the 401(k) balance
from Year 0 to Year 1, relative to changes from Year 0 to Year 1 in the accumulation rate of other
assets or liabilities, compares to the rise in the rate of increase of the 401(k) balance from Year 1 to
Year 2, relative to changes from Year 1 to Year 2 in the accumulation rate of other assets or liabilities.
These relative comparisons also suggest that intertemporal substitution is not a cause for worry.
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D. Durable Goods
I further examine durable goods in Table 6. I rst investigate the value of cars,
which are a major expenditure item for the young individuals in this sample. Indeed,
in the control and treatment groups combined, 24% of people purchased at least one
new vehicle in Year 0. Car value increases are a¤ected by 401(k) eligibility. The
coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy is -.33, signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1%
level. This corresponds to a strong e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility on the number of vehicles
that individuals own. Column 2 shows that eligibility causes a mean decrease in the
number of vehicles of -.38, with an estimate that is also extremely signicant. The
value of other vehicles is not signicantly a¤ected, with a very small equivalent dollar
value. This is unsurprising given that relatively few people own other sorts of vehicles.
Interestingly, the point estimate for the value of housing is positive, though insignicant
and imprecisely estimated. Though the coe¢ cient appears small, the equivalent dollar
value is large, since housing assets are large.
In sum, Table 6 suggests that individuals hold o¤on purchases of new cars (or selling
existing ones) in response to 401(k) eligibility, and there is a corresponding decrease in
the value of their vehicles. The Table 6 results are again similar when estimated with
a propensity score match, and these results have been omitted.
E. IRA Assets
Evidence that 401(k) eligibility "crowds in" of other forms of saving is interesting
in part because it contradicts the usual presumption that 401(k) eligibility decreases
saving in other forms. As noted earlier, "crowd-in" is nonetheless consistent with a
number of theoretical frameworks and certain existing empirical evidence. If savings
programs serve in part to increase individualspropensity to save even in non-favored
forms of saving, then models of saving must take this into account. This paper nds
evidence that IRA saving increases in response to 401(k) eligibility. Columns 1 and 2
of Table 7 break down the sample by prior 401(k) participation. Column 1 indicates
that among those who previously had no 401(k), there is a strong and highly signicant
e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility on IRA savings. By contrast, Column 2 shows that among
those who previously had a 401(k), there is an insignicantly negative e¤ect of 401(k)
eligibility. These results are consistent with the typical story of crowd-in, in which
401(k) eligibility brings those who did not previously have a 401(k) into greater contact
with saving instruments, thus leading them to save more even in non-401(k) savings
vehicles. Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001) show that education is important in
taking advantage of savings opportunities. It is apparent in Columns 3 and 4 that the
treatment e¤ect is much stronger among the more educated.
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4 Conclusion
I nd evidence that 401(k) eligibility raises 401(k) balances substantially, but I nd
no evidence that contributions to 401(k)s are o¤set by decreases in holdings of other
types of nancial assets. In fact, the estimates indicate that 401(k) eligibility may
increase IRA saving, perhaps because 401(k) participation brings individuals into con-
tact with nancial markets in ways that encourage IRA saving. Consistent with a low
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, I nd no evidence that these results stem from
intertemporal substitution. While Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) nd that 401(k)
saving is o¤set by decreases in home equity, no evidence is found that home equity de-
creases in response to 401(k) eligibility. The point estimates suggest that both secured
and unsecured debt fall in response to 401(k) eligibility, albeit insignicantly.
I nd that in response to 401(k) eligibility, accumulation of durable goods falls
substantially and signicantly. This represents the most direct existing evidence of a
decrease in consumption in response to 401(k) eligibility, since smaller durable goods
stocks correspond to smaller associated consumption ows. Consumer durables hold-
ings can be considered a form of saving, since they continue to have value to consumers
well into the future (e.g. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2001; Moulton, 2001). To
the extent that we consider durable goods to be saving, the results therefore suggest
that saving in 401(k)s is o¤set to some extent by decreases in saving in the form of
durables. If, on the other hand, we consider consumer durables to be consumption
at the time of their purchase (as they are treated in the National Income and Product
Accounts), then this paper nds no evidence of any decreases in saving outside the
401(k) in response to 401(k) eligibility.
It is worth nothing that the durable good (cars) for which the crowdout results are
strongest depreciates quickly. A standard rule of thumb is that cars lose 15-20% of
their value each year, so that after 5 years, the car will only retain 30%-45% of its initial
value. In comparison, money will normally be withdrawn from a 401(k) (or an IRA)
only at retirement. Hence, 401(k) (or IRA) saving shifts consumption much further into
the future than does durable goods "saving" in the form of a car. While the estimates
are insignicant, the point estimates for debt suggest that the fall in durable goods
accumulation may correspond to a decrease in debt, as households need to accumulate
less debt to nance their durable goods purchases. Overall, the results suggest a
multifaceted relationship between 401(k)s and saving, as falling durables purchases are
perhaps accompanied by a fall in debt.
This paper leaves a number of open questions. First, the identication strategy
pursued here examines the impact of 401(k) eligibility on saving and consumption
within one year of eligibility. One wonders about the impact at other time horizons.
Nonetheless, identifying the e¤ect of 401(k) eligibility at longer time horizons would
run into the usual problem that identication becomes more di¢ cult at long time
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horizons as other factors a¤ect the dependent variable. Arguably, in this context as
in others, identifying the e¤ect from the short-term impact yields the best possible
estimate. Second, defaulting individuals into 401(k) plans raises 401(k) contributions
dramatically (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2004). One
wonders whether defaulting people into a 401(k) has a di¤erent e¤ect on their total
saving than does 401(k) eligibility without a default.
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Figure 1. Percentage increase in mean 401(k) balance in control and treatment
Groups, Year 1 and Year 2
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Notes: The gure shows the percentage change in Year 1 and Year 2 in the mean 401(k) balance
in the treatment and control groups. Summary statistics are shown for individuals under age 65
who began working at a for-prot rm one year or less before Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP, who report
that their rm o¤ers a 401(k), and for whom there are no missing observations on any of the variables
appearing in the regressions. The treatment group is composed of individuals who report that they do
not participate in their rms 401(k) because they have not worked at the rm long enough; the control
group represents all others in the sample. Since the gure shows the increase in 401(k) balances, this
increase reects both 401(k) contributions and appreciation of existing 401(k) assets. The gure shows
unadjusted mean di¤erences between the treatment and control groups, whereas the regressions in the
Tables adjust for a variety of covariates.
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Table 1. Summary statistics: mean (standard deviation) of main variables
(1) All (2) Treatment (3) Control
Group Group
Age 35.3 (10.7) 33.4 (10.5) 36.7 (11.9)
Yearly Household Income 61795 (39171) 57843 (37594) 64668 (40074)
401(k) Assets 6369 (22621) 3664 (17076) 8334 (25758)
IRA and Keough Assets 7365 (25556) 6942 (26854) 7672 (24595)
Other Assets 2209 (16383) 1202 (3280) 3062 (21322)
Secured Debt 59843 (71789) 53868 (67238) 64186 (74695)
Unsecured Debt 6462 (13411) 6373 (12745) 6526 (13887)
Durables Value 13225 (10423) 12796 (9812) 13374 (10629)
N 799 333 466
Notes: Summary statistics are shown for individuals under age 65 who began working at a for-
prot rm one year or less before Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP, who report that their rm o¤ers a 401(k),
and for whom there are no missing observations on any of the variables appearing in the regressions.
Values of the variables shown are taken from Wave 6 of the 1996 SIPP. In each cell, the mean of the
variable in question is shown, followed by its standard deviation in parentheses. The treatment group
is composed of individuals who report that they do not participate in their rms 401(k) because they
have not worked at the rm long enough. The control group represents all others in the sample.
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Table 2. OLS regressions of the change from Year 1 to Year 2 in savings or
dissavings, on a dummy for temporary ineligibility (TEMP i) and control variables
No Controls With Controls
(1) Coe¢ cient (2) Equivalents ($) (3) Coe¢ cient (4) Equivalents ($)
on TEMPi on TEMPi
401(k) Assets .28 1026 .32 1172
(.12)** (.12)***
IRA Assets .20 1388 .21 1458
(.11)* (.11)*
Other Financial -.08 -96 -.03 -36
Assets (.16) (.16)
Secured Debt -.02 -1077 -.01 -323
(.16) (.16)
Unsecured Debt -.06 -382 -.06 -382
(.15) (.15)
Durable Goods -.34 -4351 -.33 -4223
(.11)*** (.12)***
Notes: All regressions control for age, age squared, household income, dummies for four education
categories, and a constant term. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample includes
all individuals under age 65 who report in Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP that they are in their rst year of
employment at a for-prot rm that o¤ers a tax-advantaged employer-sponsored dened contribution
pension. For asset or liability category A, the dependent variable is dened as ln(A12)-ln(A9)-[ln(A9)-
ln(A6)], where the superscript shows the 1996 SIPP wave in question. This represents the change in
the individuals saving in that asset from Year 1 to Year 2 at the rm. "Temporarily Ineligible" is a
dummy variable that equals 1 when an individual reports that s/he does not participate in the rms
tax-advantaged pension plan because s/he has not worked long enough at the rm. Liabilities are all
in positive terms, so that larger numbers represent larger liabilities. All observations are weighted by
the 1996 SIPP nal person weights. The sample size is 799 individuals, with 773 household clusters.
*** indicates signicance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Table 3. OLS regressions of Year 1 savings or dissavings, on a dummy for always
being eligible (AE i) and control variables
No Controls With Controls
(1) Coe¢ cient (2) Equivalents ($) (3) Coe¢ cient (4) Equivalents ($)
on AEi on AEi
401(k) Assets .20 733 .20 733
(.07)*** (.07)***
IRA Assets .15 1041 .13 902
(.07)** (.07)*
Other Financial -.03 -36 -.001 -1
Assets (.09) (.10)
Secured Debt -.02 -1077 -.02 -1077
(.09) (.09)
Unsecured Debt -.06 -382 -.06 -382
(.15) (.15)
Durable Goods -.18 -2303 -.15 -1919
(.07)** (.07)**
Notes: All regressions control for age, age squared, household income, dummies for four education
categories, and a constant term. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample includes
all individuals under age 65 who report in Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP that they are in their rst year of
employment at a for-prot rm that o¤ers a tax-advantaged employer-sponsored dened contribution
pension. For asset or liability category A, the dependent variable is dened as ln(A9)-ln(A6), where
the superscript shows the 1996 SIPP wave in question. In other words, the dependent variable is
saving in Year 1 in a given type of asset. AEi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when an individual
does not report that s/he does not participate in the rms tax-advantaged pension plan because s/he
has not worked long enough at the rm. Liabilities are all in positive terms, so that larger numbers
represent a larger liabilities. All observations are weighted by the 1996 SIPP nal person weights.
The sample size is 1050 individuals, with 1014 household clusters. *** indicates signicance at the
1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Table 4. OLS regressions of Year 1 savings or dissavings, on a dummy for always
being eligible (AE i) and control variables
No Controls With Controls
Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
on AEi on AEi
401(k) Assets 3732 2916
(1146)*** (1107)***
IRA Assets 5054 3217
(1800)*** (1602)**
Other Financial 6545 1000
Assets (5997) (4569)
Secured Debt -1717 -3261
(2892) (2868)
Unsecured Debt -183 -167
(850) (810)
Durable Goods -156 -347
(506) (481)
Total Net Worth 17169 11110
(7296)** (5672)**
Notes: All regressions control for age, age squared, household income, dummies for four education
categories, and a constant term. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample includes
all individuals under age 65 who report in Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP that they are in their rst year of
employment at a for-prot rm that o¤ers a tax-advantaged employer-sponsored dened contribution
pension. For asset or liability category A, the dependent variable is dened as ln(A9)-ln(A6), where
the superscript shows the 1996 SIPP wave in question. In other words, AEi is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when an individual does not report that s/he does not participate in the rms tax-advantaged
pension plan because s/he has not worked long enough at the rm. Liabilities are all in positive terms,
with a larger number representing a larger liability. All observations are weighted by the 1996 SIPP
nal person weights. The sample size is 1050 individuals, with 1014 household clusters. *** indicates
signicance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Table 5. OLS regressions of the change from Year 0 to Year 1 in savings or
dissavings, on a dummy for temporary ineligibility (TEMP i) and control variables
No Controls With Controls
(1) Coe¢ cient (2) Equivalents ($) (3) Coe¢ cient (4) Equivalents ($)
on TEMPi on TEMPi
401(k) Assets -.04 -147 -.03 -110
(.10) (.09)
IRA Assets -.16 -1111 -.16 -1111
(.15) (.14)
Other Financial .17 204 .20 240
Assets (.17) (.17)
Secured Debt .07 3770 .02 1077
(.17) (.18)
Unsecured Debt -.02 -127 -.02 -127
(.16) (.16)
Durable Goods .11 1408 .14 1791
(.13) (.14)
Notes: All regressions control for age, age squared, household income, dummies for four education
categories, and a constant term. The sample includes individuals under 65 in their rst year of
employment at a rm, who are ineligible for the rms tax-advantaged employer-sponsored dened
contribution pension in Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP. Standard errors are clustered by household. For
asset or liability category A, the dependent variable is dened as ln(A9)-ln(A6)-[ln(A6)-ln(A3)], where
the superscript shows the 1996 SIPP wave in question. For nondurable goods expenditures and utilities,
the dependent variable is dened as ln(A1)-ln(A0), where A represents the yearly level of expenditures
and the superscript shows the year in question. TEMPi is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual
is temporarily ineligible for a 401(k) in Wave 7, and 0 otherwise. Liabilities are all in positive terms,
with a larger number representing a larger liability. All observations are weighted by the 1996 SIPP
nal person weights. The sample size is 656 individuals, with 623 household clusters. The sample is
di¤erent than that in Table 2 because Table 4 includes both those temporarily ineligible for the 401(k)
and those who are always ineligible. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and
* at the 10% level.
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Table 6. OLS regressions of the change from Year 1 to Year 2 in durable goods
accumulation, on a dummy for temporary ineligibility (TEMP i) and control variables
(1) Cars (2) Number of (3) Other (4) Housing
Vehicles Vehicles
TEMPi -.33 -.38 .06 .11
(.12)*** (.17)** (.12) (.11)
Equivalents ($): 3960 N/A 43 9085
Notes: All regressions control for age, age squared, household income, dummies for four education
categories, and a constant term. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample includes
all individuals under age 65 who report in Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP that they are in their rst year of
employment at a rm that o¤ers a tax-advantaged employer-sponsored dened contribution pension.
TEMPi is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual is temporarily ineligible for a 401(k) in Wave 7, and
0 otherwise. For all assets A except number of vehicles, the dependent variable is dened as ln(A12)-
ln(A9)-[ln(A9)-ln(A6)], where the superscript shows the 1996 SIPP wave in question; for number of
vehicles, the dependent variable is [A12-A9]-[A9-A6]. "Temporarily Ineligible" is a dummy variable
that equals 1 when an individual reports that s/he does not participate in the rms tax-advantaged
pension plan because s/he has not worked long enough at the rm. Liabilities are all in positive terms,
with larger numbers representing a larger liabilities. All observations are weighted by the 1996 SIPP
nal person weights. The sample size is 799 individuals, with 773 household clusters. *** indicates
signicance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level.
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Table 7. OLS regressions of the change from Year 1 to Year 2 in IRA savings, on
a dummy for temporary ineligibility (TEMP i) and control variables
(1) No (2) Had (3) More (4) Less
Previous 401(k) Previous 401(k) Educated Educated
TEMPi .37 -.27 .32 .07
(.12)*** (.30) (.16)** (.17)
Equivalents ($) 2569 -1874 2221 486
N 606 193 467 332
Notes: All regressions control for age, age squared, household income, dummies for education
categories, and a constant term. Standard errors are clustered by household. The sample includes
all individuals under age 65 who report in Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP that they are in their rst year of
employment at a rm that o¤ers a tax-advantaged employer-sponsored dened contribution pension,
and the sample is further broken down in each column, as indicated by the column titles. TEMPi
is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual is temporarily ineligible for a 401(k) in Wave 7, and 0
otherwise. Column 3 includes only those individuals with at least some college; column 4 includes
only individuals with less than some college. The dependent variable is dened as ln(A12)-ln(A9)-
[ln(A9)-ln(A6)], where A represents IRA assets and the superscript shows the 1996 SIPP wave in
question. "Temporarily Ineligible" is a dummy variable that equals 1 when an individual reports that
s/he does not participate in the rms tax-advantaged pension plan because s/he has not worked long
enough at the rm. Liabilities are all in positive terms, with a larger number representing a larger
liability. All observations are weighted by the 1996 SIPP nal person weights. The sample size is
799 individuals, with 773 household clusters. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level; ** at the 5%
level; and * at the 10% level.
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1. Propensity score results. Dependent variable: change from
Year 1 to Year 2 in savings or dissavings
Coe¢ cient Equivalents ($)
on TEMPi
401(k) Assets .29 1063
(.11)***
IRA Assets .19 1319
(.11)*
Other Financial -.08 -96
Assets (.16)
Secured Debt -.02 -1077
(.16)
Unsecured Debt -.06 -382
(.15)
Durable Goods -.26 -3327
(.12)**
Notes: A propensity score is used to match individuals by age, years of education, household
income, marital status, household size, and rm size, with stratied matching. The rst stage results
in ve blocks, which are balanced along the covariates. The sample includes all individuals under age
65 who report in Wave 7 of the 1996 SIPP that they are in their rst year of employment at a rm
that o¤ers a tax-advantaged employer-sponsored dened contribution pension. For asset or liability
category A, the dependent variable is dened as ln(A12)-ln(A9)-[ln(A9)-ln(A6)], where the superscript
shows the 1996 SIPP wave in question. "Temporarily Ineligible" is a dummy variable that equals 1
when an individual reports that s/he does not participate in the rms tax-advantaged pension plan
because s/he has not worked long enough at the rm. Liabilities are all in positive terms, with larger
numbers representing larger liabilities. All observations are weighted by the 1996 SIPP nal person
weights. The sample size is 799 individuals.
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